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Act always so that you treat humanity whether in your person or in that of 
another always as an end, but never as a means only. 
- Immanuel Kant.** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reconstituting constitutions - along the lines of a constitutional 
archetype such as the one embodied by Article 16 of the Declaration on 
Rights of Men and Citizen of the French Revolution: "Tout societe dans Ia 
quelle Ia garantie des droits n 'est pas assuree, ni Ia separation des 
pouvoirs determinee, n 'a point de constitution" - not only implies the 
necessity to expand the actual enjoyment of human rights and separation 
of powers, on the one hand, and even the fulfillment of democracy and 
rule of law, on the other, 1 but also the real endorsement of the principles 
that exemplify a truly representative, democratic, and Federal Republic as 
Mexico constituted itself in 1916-17. 
The aim of this Essay is threefold. First, this Essay will focus on the 
main characteristics of both the great transformation, experienced in the 
Mexican institutional economic framework during the last thirty-five 
years, in general, and within the past twenty years, in particular, that were 
made through constitutional reforms. In addition, the greater expectation 
that such structural reforms generated in the process of re-enacting the 
constitution in the political context, should be along the lines of human 
rights and separation of powers. Second, this Essay will attempt to bring 
into play the role of treaties in this transformational process, by focusing 
the debate on whether the North American Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
as an international treaty, regardless of its denomination, is constitutional. 
Furthermore, this debate will concentrate the discussion on the place of 
treaties in the hierarchy of norms, by critically analyzing a controversial 
jurisprudential criteria, according to which treaties are above federal laws. 
Third, this Essay will illustrate that in an eventual conflict between a treaty 
on commerce and another treaty on human rights, the later ought to prevail 
over the former. 
** See generally KANT, infra note 69. 
l. lmer B. Aores, Constituci6n, Democracia y Derecho: Teorla Constitucional y Valores 
Constitucionales, 13 REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE LA JUDICATURA FEDERAL 145 (2003); lmer B. 
A ores, Assessing Democracy and Rule of Law: Access to Justice, IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST IVR 
WORLD CONGRESS, LUND (SWEDEN), 12-17 AUGUST, 2003, PART 1: JUSTICE, STUTTGART, FRANz 
STEINER VERLAG 146 (Aleksander Peczenik ed., 2004) [hereinafter Aores, Assessing Democracy, 
in PROCEEDINGS]. 
2005) HUMAN AND RIGHTS: COWNIAUSM, COMMERCE, AND GWBALIZATION 695 
This Essay will emphasize the (active) role of the courts and tribunals 
not only as responsible for guarding the Mexican Constitution and 
protecting human rights, but also, assuming a unified government, of 
guaranteeing further implementation of human rights through 
constitutional mutation by means of judicial interpretations. In a similar 
fashion, we will insist on the importance of considering the Senate in a 
federal state as representative of the federal entities. Moreover, we must 
first introduce a caveat regarding the process of reenacting constitutions. 
II. RECONSTITUTING CONSTITUTIONS: INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURE 
The process of reconstituting constitutions requires both institutional 
innovation and cultural renovation in order to be effective. In the recent 
past, Mexico, has been reforming most of its institutions, as is explained 
below, in section m.A. Yet, the restructuring has not truly impacted 
Mexican cultural life, belief systems, manifestations, practices, and values, 
of contemporary Mexicans. As a result, the (re)construction is still to be 
completed for the most part. In fact, in order for such processes to be 
effective, culture, in general, and the different cultural manifestations and 
practices, in particular, must be taken seriously. 
To reinforce this point that culture, and not merely institutions, must be 
considered, Jean-Paul Sartre suggests in the script called L'engrenage-
[translated into English as In the Mesh and into Spanish as El engranaje] 
- that overthrowing a tyrant to put another individual in its place is not 
going to make a significant difference, because it resembles the same 
engine from which we took an identical piece and put a duplicate engine 
in its place.2 This metaphor further explains that failure is not only of 
piecemeal institutional reforms, but also of wholesale institutional, or 
deinstitutionalized modifications as well. 
On the one hand, piecemeal reformation can occur in three ways. First, 
when the new construct fits perfectly in the place of the old institution, 
there appears no change has taken place. Second, if the new improvement 
is too big to fit, that reform will either break down and crack the machine, 
or it will be worn out until it fits rightly in the place of the previous 
structure. For example,.the first modification poses a bigger problem than 
the original one, because there is both no machine at all, or at the end of 
the day no modification present. Third, where the new piece is too small 
to replace the older structure, no transformation will be evidence. 
2. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, IN THE MESH ( 1948). 
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Therefore from these three cases, such an adjustment has no meaningful 
impact on the status quo. 
On the other hand, regarding wholesale reorganization, suppose that the 
only alternative is to substitute one apparatus for another, despite no 
significant deviation from the previous design. Although this reform 
presupposes that everything, or at least something, is wrong with the 
appliance, that does not justify replacing mechanism instead of fixing it. 
This implies that when a new device substitutes an older procedure, that 
does not necessarily mean that things are going to change. Consequently, 
the impacted engine is nothing but a piece in the pipeline of production, 
which while similarly to the piecemeal revision, the wholesale option will 
also create a substantial variation. 
I guess both cases explain why legal transplants, by either 
transplanting one part or substituting the whole institutional arrangement 
into a different cultural establishment, have rarely been entirely 
successful.3 In fact, those replaced structures that have been more or less 
useful are the result of a complex process of adoption-adaptation, in which 
culture is as serious as the grease that lubricates the machine to keep it 
functioning properly. In short, sometimes, the answer to the 
malfunctioning of the machine is neither changing one piece nor removing 
the whole mechanism, but fixing those arrangements instead. 
Someone may object that there are "terminal cases," in which the only 
thing left is to replace the broken piece or the whole mechanism. In 
addition, there is really nothing else to do but throw the entire structure 
away and get a completely different one to take the place of the old. A 
possibility is that this applies to all cases terminal or not. However, a mere 
substitution does not imply necessarily that a true change in the state of 
affairs (other than the substitution itself) is achieved. The false belief that 
part of, or the whole, should be removed leads to a much worse result, as 
Boris Pasternak suggests in his novel, Doctor Zhivago, that "It has often 
happened in history that a lofty ideal has degenerated into crude 
materialism. Thus Greece gave way to Rome, and the Russian 
Enlightenment has become the Russian Revolution. "4 
At this point, I would like to explain three of my main arguments. First, 
although there is a strong tendency, especially in the civil law tradition, to 
think that it is enough to enact "law" to automatically alter "reality," 
clearly this is seldom the case. Second, to sustain the existing 
3. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. 
L. Ill {1997); see generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPlANTS: AN APPROACH TO 
COMPARATNELAW (2d ed. 1993). 
4. BORIS PASTERNAK, DOCTOR ZHiv AGO (1958). 
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"normativity" or to substitute it with an alternative "counter-normativity" 
we must also try to place them into an actual "normality" and displace the 
"abnormality" responsible for the malfunction.5 Third, the institutional 
innovation must be complemented by a cultural renovation, which occurs 
by taking culture, and the cultural manifestations and practices, seriously.6 
Therefore, a successful amendment must take these three relationships into 
account. Furthermore, in order to successfully apply those connections a 
consequential, functional, or sociological approach to law is required, at 
least to foresee whether a constitutional reform - or a legislative 
enactment - is going to be successful at all. 7 
As a result of the above issues, it is necessary for Mexico to 
reconstitute its Constitution in at least two fundamental ways to empower 
the country of Mexico. First, the Mexican government must reform its 
human rights and separation of powers, in general, and the courts and 
tribunals as the guardians of the Mexican Constitution and of the 
protection of human rights, in particular. Second, Mexico must become a 
democratic government of, by, and for all the people in which, the rule of 
law is enforced by the government from those rules, regardless of gender. 8 
All these ideals can be synthesized into one principle, isonomy. From 
this principle, there should be equal application and protection of law to 
all no matter their relationship with the government, racial background, 
economic status, gender, sexual orientation, religious or non-religious 
beliefs, or national origin.9 However, the problem is that in a world 
characterized by great division and inequality, the application and 
5. !MER B. FLoRES & CEsAR FLoRES MANCILLA, LAs PARADOJAS ENTRE CULTURA DE lA 
LEGAUDAD E INSTITUCIONES JURfDICAS EN MEXICO (forthcoming 2005). Cf. HERMAN HEuER, 
TEoRfA DEL EsT ADO 199-216 & 267-89 (Luis Tobio trans., Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica 1942) 
( 1934 ). GUIU.ERMO O'DoNNEll. & PHn.lPPE C. SCHMITIER, TRANsmoNS FROM AUTHORITARIAN 
RUIE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES 65 (1986). 
6. See generally FRANCIS FuKUYAMA, TRUST, THE SOCIAL VIRTUESANDTHECREATIONOF 
PROSPERITY (1995); CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS (Samuel P. 
Huntington & Lawrence E. Harrison eds., 2000). 
7. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 
35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). 
8. Cf. 2 THuCYDIDES, HisTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR § 37, at 145 (Penguin Books 
1972) (431 B.C.E.) ("Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in hands not of a 
minority but of the whole people."); Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, (Nov. 19, 1863 ), 
in LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 308 ( 1990) ("government of the people, by the people,for the people") 
(emphasis added). See also ARISTOTLE: THE Pouncs (Stephen Everson ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988). 
9. IMERB.FLoRES,HERACUTOVIS-A-VISPARMENIDES:CAMBIOYPERMANENCIACOMOIA 
PRINCIPAL FuNCI6N DEL DERECHO EN UNA DEMOCRACIA INCIPIENTE (forthcoming 2006). 
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protection of the law rarely achieves the above mentioned democratic, and 
rule of law, objectives without those ambitions being compromised. 
ill. RECONSTITUTING THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION 
According to Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution, "The national 
sovereignty resides essentially and originally in the people."1° Further, 
Article 40 states, ''The will of the Mexican people is to constitute a 
representative, democratic, [and] federal Republic, composed of free and 
sovereign states in everything concerning to their internal affairs; but joint 
together into a Federation established according to the principles of this 
fundamental law." 11 At this point, it is worth noting that Mexico has thirty-
one states and one Federal District that total thirty-two federal entities. 
However, much has been said of the historically unrepresentative, 
authoritarian, and centralized features of the Mexican legal and political 
system. These tensions between the formal and real constitutions justify, 
at least partially, the need not only for reforming our Mexican Constitution 
to reduce the gap between the two but also for reconstituting it into a true 
representative, democratic, and Federal Republic. 
In fact, the Mexican Constitution was promulgated on February 5, 1917 
and went into force on May 1st of the same year containing 136 articles 
and 16 transitory dispositions. From that time to now, it has been reformed 
by 160 decrees, which comprehend 427 additions or modifications to its 
text, including 3 transitory dispositions that were subsequently derogated. 
It is worth mentioning that the first half of those decrees were published 
prior to February 6, 1975, in almost 60 years, and the other half in the last 
30 years. As a result, 172 alterations were made in 58 years (2.96 per 
year), whereas 255 in the last 30 years (8.5 per year). This means that two 
fifths of the reforms came in two thirds of the time the Mexican 
Constitution originated, while the other three fifths came in the remaining 
one third. 
A. The Great Transformation 
The reforms under the presidencies of Luis Echeverria Alvarez (1970-
1976) and Jose LOpez Portillo (1976-1982) tota128 decrees (2.33 per year) 
and 74 additions or modifications (6.16 per year), while in the aftermath 
ofNAFT A during the presidency ofErnesto Zedillo Ponce de Le6n (1994-
10. MEX. CONST. second title, ch.1, art. 39. 
11. /d. art. 40. 
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2000) there were 18 decrees (3 per year) and 77 alterations (12.8 per year). 
It is worth noting that in 1997 under Zedillo, Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRJ) lost for the first time its absolute majority in both chambers, 
and retained the relative majority in the Senate. Since that political shift 
the phenomenon of "divided government" has become the general rule. As 
the procedure to reform the Mexican Constitution requires a majority of 
two-thirds of members of Congress in both Chambers, as well as a 
majority of the local legislatures (Article 135) the pace of constitutional 
reform has slowed down since 1997.12 This lag in the reform process in the 
first four years of the presidency of Vicente Fox Quesada there have been 
only 10 decrees (2.5 per year) with 18 reforms (4.5 per year). 
In the last few years, there has been an impasse between the executive 
and the two chambers of the legislature. Because of this stall the Judiciary, 
mostly the Mexican Supreme Court and other major courts and tribunals 
as well, have, through the interpretation of the Constitution and their 
constitutional doctrine, reformed the Mexican Constitution informally or 
materially, because of a phenomenon described as constitutional mutation 
via judicial interpretation. 
It is also important that during the two previous presidential terms prior 
to NAFf A signing, ratifying, and entering into force, that is in the 
Presidencies of Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado ( 1982-1988) and Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994), 34 decrees and 120 additions and 
modifications (10 per year) took place. In order to prepare the ground for 
that NAFfA signing 19 decrees (3.16 per year) and 65 alterations (10.83 
per year), 15 decrees (2.5 per year) and 55 reforms (9.16 per year), 
respectively occurred. Moreover, keep in mind that Mexico entered the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986 and NAFTA in 
1994. 
Certainly, in the last third of the twentieth century- and especially in 
the past twenty years, the great transformation, at least in formal terms by 
the quantity, and not necessarily by the quality, of constitutional reforms, 
is self-evident. Indeed, Mexico has transformed significantly from 
predominantly rural to predominantly urban society, from a closed 
economy to an open one; and from an authoritarian tradition to a more 
democratic one. 13 However, the gap between what Octavio Paz labeled as 
12. MEX. CONST. eight title, art. 135. 
13. SERGIO L6PEZ A YIJ..6N, LAS TRANSFORMACIONES DEL SISTEMA JURfDICO Y LOS 
SIGNIFlCADOS SOCIAIJ:.S DEL DERECHO EN MEXICO. LA ENCRUCUADA ENTRE TRADICI6N Y 
MODERNIDAD 89 (1997). 
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"Two Mexicos" subsists and the question on whether which one is going 
to be able to pull the other up or down remains unanswered. 14 
The great transformation was chiefly economical. The idea of that 
modification was to replace the model of import substitution for one of an 
open market economy, labeled as "neoliberalism." John Williamson 
expressed that this economy is a "Washington consensus," which required 
not only the defeat of the central planning of the welfare and corporate 
state but also the want for a (structural) Economical Reform which 
comprises of four proceedings. First, stabilization must take place, through 
maintaining the balance in the budgetary and financial plans, as well as by 
reducing public debt. Second, integration has to occur, by disenabling 
protectionism and evolving a commercial incorporation into the world 
economy, in general, and the North American economy, in specific. This 
new development happens through a process of openness that flows goods 
and services, as well as foreign investments, but not (or at least not yet) of 
persons. Third, privatization is needed, by reducing the public participation 
of the Mexican state in the economy and by returning the Mexican state to 
private both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs. Fourth, liberalization 
must take place, through restricting state interference in the economy. 
Although the great transformation was essentially economical, it was 
complemented to some extent in the political and social realm, including 
the legal one. In that sense, the political reform can be traced to the 
explicit and formal recognition, in 1953, of the women's right to vote in 
federal elections, to the introduction, in 1963, of proportional 
representation schemes, and to the reduction of the age to vote at 18 years 
in 1969 and to hold elective office in both chambers of Congress, 
specifically, in the Camara de Diputados at 21 years of age and the Senado 
at the age of 30 in 1972.15 
Moreover, the various aspects of the political reform were gradually 
enhanced in 1977, 1986, 1990, and 1996, while promoting three 
improvements. First representation was encouraged, by increasing the 
number of representatives in Congress's minority parties through 
proportional representation. Second, separation was advanced, through 
creating an authority responsible for organizing the elections independent 
of the executive branch, Instituto Federal Electoral; Third specialization 
14. Octavio Paz, Postdata, in EL LABERINTO DE lA SOLEDAD, POSTDATA, VUELTA AL 
LABERINTO DE lA SOLEDAD 287 (2003). 
15. Imer B. Flores, Gobemabilidad y Representatividad: Hacia un Sistema Democratico 
Electoral Mayoritario y Proporcional, in SISTEMA REPRESENT A TIVO Y DEMOCRACIA SEMIDIRECI' A, 
MEMORIADELVIICONGRESOIBEROAMERICANODEDERECHOCONSTITUCIONAL209,213-15(Hugo 
A. Concha Cantu ed., 2002). 
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was fostered, by creating in the judiciary a tribunal specialized in the 
qualification of the elections, instead of doing it politically by the 
legislative branch, the Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de Ia 
Federaci6n. 
In addition, the 1990 reform doubled the number of senators, starting 
in 1994, from 2 per each federal entity to 4. According to that criteria, each 
political party can nominate 2 candidates in a formula and the winning 
majority formula gets the 2 first seats, while the first minority gets only 1 
(the first of the 2 persons mentioned in the formula) and the remaining 
fourth seat is designated through proportional representation. However, the 
latter mechanism compromises federalism. Similarly, to the United States, 
the Senate was introduced originally in 1824, suppressed in 1836, and 
reintroduced later in 1874 supposedly to represent large and small states 
alike. Yet, with this American scheme there is a distortion in the federal 
composition of the higher chamber of Congress. 16 
The other major political reform was the modification of the structure 
of the government of the Distrito Federal in 1996. Before that the local 
authorities were appointed directly by the President, now they are mostly 
elected. The J efe del Gobierno del Distrito Federal and the Delegados 
since 1997 and 2000 are elected, although some are still appointed by the 
federal executive, after being proposed by the local executive, but those 
Jefe del Gobierno del Distrito Federal and the Delegados can be stopped 
only by the former (i.e., such as the General Attorney and the Secretary of 
Public Security). In addition, there was not a true local legislature until 
1994. That legislature was simply an assembly of representatives, with no 
legislative powers of their own. In fact, Congress still keeps some 
governance over Mexico City, the capital of Mexico. 
The significant reforms in the social realm involved major cornerstones 
of the Mexican government, such as Articles 3, 27, and 130 of the 
Mexican Constitution. In 1993, the educational reform to Article 3 
enlarged the obligation of the state, throughout Mexico's three levels of 
government (i.e., federal, local and municipal) which guarantee education 
to all people from elementary, including preschool, to secondary school. 
Likewise, the agrarian or land reform and the religious reform, required 
the alteration of Articles 27 and 130, which until then were considered as 
fundamental political decisions to remain unchanged. These agrarian and 
16. /d. at 234. Cf. lmer B. FLoRES, Democracia y Participacion: Consideraciones Sobre la 
Representacion Politica, in DEMOCRACIA Y REPRESENTACI6N EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI, 
MEMORIA DEL ill CONGRESO lNTERNACIONAL DE DERECHO ElECTORAL 195, 233 (J. Jesus Orozco 
Henriquez et al. eds., 1999). 
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religious improvements represented two major developments in Mexican 
history, the Revolution of 1910 and the (Liberal) Reform of 1856-57. 
Moreover, both were reformed, in early 1992, the former to recognize 
legal personality to populations called "ejidales" and "comunales," and to 
remove some restrictions on their property of the land, as well as to 
establish a federal jurisdiction, attributed to a specialized TribunalAgrario 
and Procuradur(a Agraria. The latter reform recognized legal personality 
in equal terms of all "religious associations" and, at the same time, 
reinforced the "liberty of religion" in equivalent terms to all. Also during 
this period those modifications maintain the separation between church 
and state. 
In the legal realm, probably the most important reform was borrowed 
from the Scandinavian Ombudsman (in the form of a President of the 
Human Rights National Commission) which guaranteed respect for human 
rights - especially in the criminal and penal realm (eradicating 
disappearances, torture). However, after NAFfA took effect, the most 
successful reform has been in the judicial branch, which decreased the 
Mexican Supreme Court from 21 justices (plus 5 supernumerary to make 
a total of 26) to 11, one of the eleven.being the chief justice. Further, this 
improvement of the judicial branch created a Consejo de la Judicatura, 
composed of7 counselors in charge of the administrative staff of the court, 
which the chief justice presided over. Consequently, the Mexican Supreme 
Court gained some of the governing powers that usually correspond to a 
constitutional tribunal, such as resolving constitutional controversies 
between different branches or levels of government. However, that 
Supreme Court retained the undue centralized monopoly of judicial review 
of the laws constitutionality. 
It is also worth pointing out that much of these transformations were 
accompanied by the signing, ratifying, and entering into force of several 
international treaties, besides GATT and NAFf A. Those international 
treaties not only impacted commerce but also human rights as well. 
Indeed, in the last 34 years, Mexico has ratified more than 50 treaties on 
Commerce, on one hand, and also over 50 treaties on Human Rights and 
other related topics, on the other hand. 
As a result the Mexican state has accepted the competence of the Inter-
American Council and Court on Human Rights, 17 where Mexico has 
17. Jorge Ulises Carmona Tinoco, Algunos Aspectos de Ia Participacion de Mexico ante los 
6rganos del Sistema lnteramericano de Protecci6n de los Derechos Humanos, 9 CUESTIONES 
CONSTITUCJONALES. REVISTA MEXICANA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 3 (2003). 
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already been sued, 18 and the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committees 
of the United Nations. 19 The Mexican government has also brought one 
case to the International Court of Justice, against the United States for the 
human rights violations of Mexican citizens sentenced to the death penalty 
and executed on U.S. soil.20 
Therefore, the impact of international law and treaties in the Mexican 
legal and judicial system has increased significantly. For instance, Sergio 
L6pez-Ayll6n and Hector Fix-Fierros' research that comprises the years 
1917-1998, encompasses 200,000 jurisprudential criterions of the Mexican 
Supreme Court, and analyzes 106 significantly referred to treaties like 68 
treaties dictated between 1917 and 1988 (0.96 per year) and 38 agreements 
between 1988 and 1998 (3.45 per year).21 This increase implies not only 
the reexamination of the relationship between international law and 
national law, but also a much faster incorporation and reception of the 
former international law into the latter national law with a subsequent 
conflict between them. In fact, one of the major accomplishments was 
passing, in 1992, a bill on treaties (Ley Sabre la Celebraci6n de Tratados ). 
B. The Great( er) Expectation 
The expectation of reform was higher as a result of the earlier 
transformations and the winning of the Presidency by a candidate from a 
political party other than PRI. The initial direction of the Mexican 
government was fivefold. First, the government needed to continue and 
pursue other features of the previous reforms such as the educational 
reform, which remained incomplete. Second, the government must enact 
political reform, by strengthening Congress and limiting executive power, 
18. Jorge Ulises Carmona Tinoco, El caso Alfonso Martfn del Campo Dodd vs. Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, ante Ia Corte lnteramericana de Derechos Humanos, 5 ANuARIO MEXICANO 
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 705 (2005). 
19. Jorge Ulises Carmona Tinoco, El Significado de Ia Aceptacion de Ia Competencia de los 
Comites de Naciones Unidas, Facultados para Decidir Peticiones Individuales en Materia de 
Derechos Humanos y su Previsible impacto en Ia lmparticion de Justicia en Mexico, 1 REFORMA 
JUDICIAL, REVIST A MEXICAN A DE JUSTICIA 161 (2003 ). 
20. Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo, El caso Avena y Otros Nacionales Mexicanos (Mexico c. 
Estados Unidos de America) ante la Corte lntemacional de Justicia), 5 ANuARIO MEXICANO DE 
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 173 (2005). 
21. Sergio L6pez-Ayl16n & Hector Fix-Fierro, jTan Cerca, Tan Lejos! Estado de Derecho 
y Cambio Juridico en Mexico 1970-1999, 97 BOIETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO 155, 
252-53 (2000). Jorge Ulises Carmona Tinoco, La Aplicaci6n Judicial de los Tratados de Derechos 
Humanos, in DERECHO INTERNACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS. MEMORIA DEL VII 
CONGRESO IBEROAMERICANO DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 189 (Ricardo Mendez Silva ed., 
2002). 
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and completing the restructuring of the Federal District in more equal 
terms in relation to other federal entities. Third, Mexico should legislate 
judicial reform, by reforming the Ley de Amparo to enforce, among other 
things, compliance with international treaties regarding human rights (the 
initiative was presented in the Senate in 2003 and remains in the 
Committees). Fourth, there has to be an agreement between economical 
reform and a comprehensive social reform. Fifth, some aspects of the 
financial reform, besides those necessary for macroeconomic stability and 
other features of the so-called structural reform. For instance, there is still 
reforms missing in tax, and other second generation improvements in 
energy, labor, and others as well. 
Since the historical process for further constitutional reforms appears 
to be blocked due to the fact that neither party has more than a two-third 
majority in either chamber of Congress, the alternate route, namely the 
constitutional mutation via judicial interpretation by the Mexican Supreme 
Court and other major courts and tribunals, has become increasingly 
necessary. The intent of this Essay is not to argue that everything the 
judiciary does is right, but when compared to the poor performance of the 
Presidency and of Congress, that Judiciary has been active improving the 
political process. By making these modifications, these judges are being 
charged with "judicialization of politics" and "politization of justice." Yet 
if one of those judges intervenes in an issue politicians cannot decide the 
judges are not seen as making politics and justice politicized, while at the 
same time in which those judges started to fulfill their duties by extending 
their control over illegal exercise of power by elected officials and 
representatives. 22 
For the first time, the Mexican Supreme Court has become an 
independent final arbiter in disputes between branches of government or 
the federal government and the citizenry. In fact, recently, the President 
had to withdraw a takings decree, related to the construction of the new 
international airport in the metropolitan area of Mexico City. The 
withdrawal occurred not only as a consequence of the violent 
demonstrations against that decree, but also because the court was 
presumably going to hold that the decree was unconstitutional because it 
failed, according to their previous jurisprudential criterions, to provide a 
fair compensation. 
In summary, there have been recent outstanding rulings in five areas of 
reform. First, the political reform, recognized the same legal status to Jefe 
de Gobiemo del Distrito Federal as the one enjoyed by the governors of 
22. Flores, Assessing Democracy, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 1. 
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the thirty-one states, but there was a different legal give to the legislative 
assembly as opposed to the legislatures of other federal entities. Second, 
the energy reform, reformulate the limits to what can be done with or 
without further constitutional reform by holding that an executive decree 
was unconstitutional and suggested that if asked would rule the federal 
statute is unconstitutional as well. Third, the labor reform, endorsed the 
"freedom of association" by ruling out a statute establishing that there 
must be a sole union per public department. Fourth, the political reform, 
reinforced the democratization of the political parties, by not allowing 
independent candidacies to act inconsistent with the need for consolidating 
political parties. Fifth the legal reform, reinterpreted the criteria regarding 
the hierarchy of laws in order to hold that international treaties are above 
the federal laws when they constitute long-term arrangements with the 
Mexican state. 23 
IV. THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION AND NAFf A 
Since it is said that most of the reforms evolve around NAFfA it is 
necessary to explore its relationship to the Mexican Constitution. We will 
examine briefly whether NAFf A is constitutional and then explore more 
deeply the hierarchy of norms and the place occupied by international 
treaties. It is helpful for clarity to contrast the cases of Mexico and the 
United States. 
A. Is NAFTA Constitutional? 
The debate on whether NAFf A is constitutional took place in both the 
United States and Mexico, but it was on very different grounds in each. In 
Mexico, the discussion was primarily aimed to effect the reform of aspects 
of the legal system that actually were or might be contradictory to it. In 
Mexico, NAFf A was signed by the President of Mexico and ratified by a 
simple majority of the Mexican Senate as established by the current 
interpretation of the "treaty clause" of the Mexican Constitution. 24 
As a result, for Mexicans, NAFfA is a treaty on free trade for North 
America- in the full meaning of the word treaty. It is not merely an 
Agreement. In Mexico it is called Tratado de Libre Comercio de America 
del Norte (TLCAN or TLC). Under Mexican law, with the sanction of the 
23. See generally infra N.B. 
24. Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, Diario 
Oficial de Ia Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.) art. 133. 
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Ley Sobre la Celebracion de Tratados, as long as it is approved in 
accordance with the requirements of the Mexican Constitution's "treaty 
clause" it is a treaty. 25 Article 2.1 establishes this regardless of the 
document's nomenclatures or the ratifying procedures followed by the 
counter-signing parties. 26 
In contrast, in the United States, as Bruce Ackerman and David Golove 
discuss in their article "Is NAFfA Constitutional?," issues may exist as a 
result of the fact that NAFfA was approved in the United States as a 
congressional-executive agreement, not as a treaty.27 Under U.S.law trade 
agreements do not need to comply with the "treaty clause" of Article 2, 
clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which requires treaties to be approved 
by two thirds of the Senate,28 but only require approval according to the 
two-House procedure of the Trade Act of 1974, which require only a 
simple majority of both chambers of Congress.29 
Ultimately, NAFfA was voted first in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and passed only by a small margin of 234 to 200. It was 
then passed in the Senate by a vote of 61 to 38, less than two thirds.30 
Thus, in the United States the answer to the question of NAFfA's 
constitutionality depends on whether the "treaty clause" is the exclusive 
means of committing the nation internationally, as the originalist school 
of thought believes, or if there are other legitimate methods, such as the 
congressional-executive agreement, and simple majorities in both 
chambers of Congress may commit the nation. 31 
Historically the congressional-executive agreement derives from the 
constitutional revolution of the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
was designed to complement, not necessarily to displace, the "treaty 
clause" with a fast-track commercial procedure. This process has been 
used to approve many international accords on commerce, including the 
World Trade Organization.32 NAFfA has specifically held up to 
25. Ley Sobre Ia Celebracion de Tra Tados [L.S.C.T]. 
26. /d. 
27. See generally Bruce Ackerman & David Go love, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. 
L. REv. 99 (1995). 
28. U.S. CaNST. art. IT, § 2, cl. 2. 
29. 19 u.s.c. 2101-2487 (1974). 
30. See 139 CONG. REc. S16, 712-13 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993); 139 CONG. REc. HIO, 048 
(daily ed. Nov. 17, 1993). 
31. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 27. 
32. /d. 
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constitutional challenges-a district court held that it was a legitimate 
exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 33 
The fast-track process was arguably developed to reform the 
international trade agreement process and take some issues out of the 
formal treaty process. Consequently, NAFrA is a prime illustration of 
major changes in the original constitutional practice of both countries. 
B. What is the Legal Hierarchy ofTreaties? 
In Mexico, the most interesting legal contest has not been on the 
constitutionality of NAFT A but it has been the controversy over the place 
that treaties occupy within the hierarchy of the Mexican normative system. 
In the United States the U.S. Constitution has a "Supremacy Clause" 
contained in the second clause of Article 6, which states "This 
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in 
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land. "34 The same formulation was introduced in Mexico first into Article 
126 of the Mexican Constitution of 1857 and again in Article 133 of the 
Mexican Constitution of 1917 that establishes, ''This Constitution, the laws 
of Congress in pursuance thereof and all the Treaties in accordance with 
it ... shall be the Supreme Law of all the Union."35 
There are three facets to the Mexican "Supremacy Clause."36 The first 
facet is, the Mexican Constitution alone is the highest point of the legal 
hierarchy or Hans Kelsen' s "pyramid. "37 The second aspect is, the laws 
passed by the Mexican legislature and the treaties approved by Congress 
are subordinate to the Constitution. The third view is that the Mexican 
Constitution, laws and treaties shall be jointly considered as the Mexican 
supreme law. In this structure, it remains unclear, however, which aspect 
prevails in case of a conflict pertaining to a law or a treaty. 
In 1992, the Mexican Supreme Court- before NAFrA and the 
Judicial Reform of 1994-95 - held unanimously, the jurisprudential 
33. Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1226 (N.D. Ala. 1999). 
Comment, Constitutional Law- Treaty Clause. District Coun Holds that NAFTA is a Valid 
Exercise of the Foreign Commerce Power Made in the USA Foundation v. United States, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1234 (2000). 
34. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
35. MEx. CONST. art. 133. 
36. HANS KELSEN,INTRODUCTIONTOTHE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY (Bonnie L. Paulson 
& Stanley L. Paulson trans., Carendon Press, Oxford 1992); HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHfSLEHRE 
[PURETHEORYOFLAW) (1934). 
37. ld. 
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principle "LEYES FEDERALES Y TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES, 
TIENEN LA MISMA JERARQUIA NORMATIVA," (the english translation 
is "Federal laws and international treaties, have the same normative 
hierarchy").38 Accordingly, laws and treaties in the legal system "occupy, 
both, the rank immediately inferior to the Constitution in the hierarchy of 
norms."39 That is why those laws and treaties have the same status, 
because "the treaty cannot be the criteria to determine the constitutionality 
of a law and vice versa." 
Nonetheless, in 1999, this principle was reversed- after NAFfA and 
the Judicial Reform- unanimously (by the Mexican Supreme Court) 
held that "TRATADOS INTERNACIONALES. SE UBICAN 
JERARQUICAMENTE POR ENCIMA DE LAS LEYES FEDERALES YEN 
UN SEGUNDO PLANO RESPECTO DE LA CONSTITUCI6N 
FEDERAL," translated as "International Treaties are located hierarchically 
above federal laws and in second place with respect to the Federal 
Constitution." Consequently, since treaties are now above laws it follows 
that a treaty can be the criteria to determine the constitutionality of a law, 
but not inversely.40 
It is important to explo:re the implications of overturning the prior 
principle since this principle has been applied recently and there is at least 
one case under review by the Mexican Supreme Court at this time.41 
38. SemanarioJudicial de Ia Federacion, P. C/92, Mexico,8 de Diciembre de 1992, T. LX, 
No. 205,596,27. 
39. Semanario Judicial de Ia Federacion, P. LXXVW1999, Mexico, 9 de Noviembre de 
1999, T. X, No. 192,867. 
40. Manuel Becerra Ramfrez et al., Tratados lntemacionales. Se Ubican Jerarquicamente 
por Encima de las Leyes yen un Segundo Plano Respecto de Ia Constitucion Federal (Amparo en 
Revision 1475/98), 3 CUESTIONES CONSTITUCIONALES, REVISTA MExiCANA DE DERECHO 
CONSTITUCIONAL 169, 169-208 (2000). 
41. 
TRABAJADORES EXTRANJEROS. CUANDO DEMANDAN ACCIONES 
LABORALES INHERENTES A RIESGOS DE TRABAJO, LAS 
AUTORIDADES DE LA REPUBUCA NO EST AN OBLIGADAS A 
EXIGIRLES QUE PREVIAMENTE LES COMPRUEBEN SU LEGAL 
ESTANCIA EN EL PAiS, EN TERMINOS DEL ARTICULO 1o., PARRAFO 
SEGUNDO, DEL CONVENIO RELATIVO A LA IGUALDAD DE TRATO A 
LOS TRABAJADORES EXTRANJEROS Y NACIONALES EN MATERIA DE 
REPARACI6N DE LOS ACCIDENTES DEL TRABAJO, POR SER 
JEAARQUICAMENTE SUPERIOR A LAS LEYES FEDERALES QUEASf LO 
EXUAN. 
Semanario Judicial de Ia Federacion, N. 2o. T. 78 L, Mexico, Febrero de 2004, T. XIX, 1163. 
2005) HUMAN AND RIGHTS: COWNIAUSM, COMMERCE, AND GWBAUZATION 7fYJ 
It is clear that this decision as Jorge Carpizo, an eminent constitutional 
law scholar states "is one of the most important approved by the Supreme 
Court of Justice since 1995."42 It is noteworthy however that some of its 
answers are still being challenged and there are al&o still some unanswered 
questions. The fact that the Mexican Supreme Court held unanimously in 
opposite direction in less than a decade should be seen in the light of there 
being two distinct courts- before and after the judicial reform of 1995. 
The origin of the new principle was a case, which was heard by the 
Mexican Supreme Court and documented in the ruling amparo en revision 
1475/98. In that case the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice determined 
that Article 68 of Ley Federal de los Trabajadores al Servicio del Estado 
(LFTSE) is inconsistent with Article 2 of Convention No. 87. Article 68 
concerns freedom of association and protection of the right to organize, 
regarding the International Labour Organization (ILO), and Article 87 
focuses on the latter consecrates the freedom to unionize and the former 
states that "in each public department there must be a sole union." 
Convention No. 87 has the statute of a treaty and the issue was whether the 
law, LFTSE Article 68, was in conflict. 
The issue that the Mexican Supreme Court resolved in the appeal 
however was not the original one brought before the lower federal court. 
In that case heard by the lower federal court, the Judge had to rule that 
since Article 68 of LFTSE imposes a limitation to the right to unionize 
which is recognized in Article 123 of the Mexican Constitution43 it is 
unconstitutional and for that reason the government must not apply it. It 
was the Supreme Court itself, as Jose Ramon Cossfo- a former legal 
scholar recently appointed to be a justice on the Mexican Supreme Court 
- pointed out, that brought the treaty into the forefront and the Mexican 
hierarchy of co-equal laws and treaties into scrutiny. 44 Other legal scholars 
have speculated that because the petitioner quoted the old jurisprudential 
principle that laws and treaties had the same hierarchy and hence cannot 
be used to determine its constitutionality, but the lower court did not 
follow this law and simply crafted a better one. 45 
Edgar Corzo Sosa is concerned that the ruling of the lower court judge 
and the confirmation by the Supreme Court in this case encourages 
authorities to avoid the application of an article that in their opinion is 
unconstitutional with the consequent risk that a collective legislative body 
42. Ramirez et al., supra note 40, at 177, 183. 
43. MEX. CONST. art. 123. 
44. Jose Ram6n Cosslo, La Nueva Jerarqu(a de los Tratados lntemacionales, EsTEP Afs 34 
(2000). 
45. Ramirez et al., supra note 40, at 183, 185. 
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is over ruled by one bureaucrat alone. Sosa suggests that the lower court 
judge must enforce the application of an article of doubtful constitutional 
pedigree until the higher courts rule it out completely. However he 
recognizes that there should be little concern since in both cases the 
actions of a federal entity applying an apparently unconstitutional article 
can be prevented or even appealed. 46 
The lower court judge, by deviating from such application, is forcing 
the higher courts to make a definitive ruling on the issue at stake. This 
problem possibly refers to the flaws of the Mexican centralized system of 
judicial review, which needs to be improved, which is recognized in the 
second part of Article 133,by asserting that ''The judges in each State will 
fix everything to the Constitution, laws and treaties notwithstanding the 
contrary dispositions that there might be in the Constitutions or laws of the 
States."47 
The Mexican Supreme Court could merely have confirmed the decision 
of the lower court stating that such article cannot be applied because it was 
unconstitutional. Yet the Mexican Supreme Court instead decided to go 
further by overruling the prior principle. They chose to displace the rule 
that federal laws and international treaties occupy the same rank in the 
hierarchy of norms and so the treaty cannot determine the constitutionality 
of a law and vice versa with the rule that treaties are above federal laws 
and thus may be used to determine the constitutionality of federal laws. 
The Mexican Supreme Court intentionally chose to reconstitute the 
hierarchy of norms of Mexican laws. 
There are two chief models for the reception of international law in the 
law of a nation. The first ·model is the transformation (or indirect 
reception) into national law through a legislative enactment. The second 
model is the incorporation (or direct reception) into national law without 
further legislative endorsement. It is also worth pointing out that these 
distinctions do not necessarily coincide with a treaty being self-executing 
or not. A self-executing treaty generally does not necessitate any further 
legislative requirement, but a treaty that is not requires governmental 
action. 48 Some authors suggest that since in Mexico the reception for all 
treaties takes place without further legislative enactment, all treaties are 
self-executing and hence superior to laws. 
46. Id. at 187. 
47. MEX. CONST. art. 133. 
48. Ramirez et al., supra note 40, at 169, 172-74; cf Miguel Rabago, Aplicacion de Tratados 
Intemacionales por Parte de los Tribunates Mexicanos: Algunas Observaciones Relativas a su 
Efecto Directo, 6 REVISTA MEXICANA DE DERECHO PUBUCO 121 (2004). 
2005) HUMAN AND RIGHTS: COWNIAUSM, COMMERCE. AND GLOBAUZATION 711 
Indeed, the Mexican legal system supports the incorporation or direct 
reception by not demanding any further requirements for some treaties, but 
in practice there are treaties that by their terms do need additional 
legislation. Self-executing treaties, such as those on human rights, tend to 
be incorporated immediately into the Constitution and other treaties, such 
as those on commerce, tend to require a complementary legislative 
enactment. It should be readily seen why a self-executing treaty should be 
superior to any law. 
There are three main arguments for the change in hierarchy of legal 
norms. First, treaties are international commitments assumed by the 
Mexican State at large, and compel all their federal entities towards the 
international community. That is why both the President, as the head of the 
(federal) state, and the Senate, as representative of the federal entities, had 
to be the ones to participate in the "treaty power." This is a material 
legislative power given to the President that must be approved by a simple 
majority of the Senate and not by a two thirds majority as in the United 
States. 
Sovereign States, as other members of the international community, are 
free to acquire further duties through treaties. Furthermore, they cannot 
ignore such obligations freely attained by following the principles of pacta 
sunt servanda and rebus sic stantibus, in which treaties must be obeyed 
with good faith, unless in the meantime the signing conditions have 
changed substantially. Similarly, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on 
Treaties of 1969 establishes that "A State cannot invoke its national law 
as a justification for not complying with a treaty."49 
The question remains whether the President and the Senate are an 
adequate means of representing both the federal state and the federal 
entities. One could argue that the answer is affirmative, but there are 
several contrary opinions that must briefly be addressed and discussed. 
For instance, Diego Valades, a prominent constitutional law scholar, 
suggested in an editorial that due to this asymmetry, the President and the 
Senate, through the making of treaties, could overrule the decision of the 
federal and local congresses. 5° Similarly, Corzo inquires not only whether 
the lower chamber has to approve the treaties as well or even the local 
chambers have to be taken into account in the process but also whether the 
judicial review of treaties must be a priori instead of a posteriori.51 Yet, 
49. Vienna Convention on Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 art. 27. 
50. Diego Valades, Asimetrias en el Congreso, EXCElsiOR 27 1, 9 (2000). 
51. Ramirez et al., supra note 40, at 190, 194, 196. Cf MIGUEL RABAGO, Propuesta de 
Reforma al Articulo 105 de Ia CPEUM: Hacia un Control Previo de Constitucionalidad de los 
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L6pez-Ayll6n claims that other subnational entities, such as states and 
municipalities, must participate in the treaties and even that some 
agreements on human rights must be subjected to referendum. 52 Also, 
Carpizo contends that the Senate no longer represents the federal entities, 
since local legislatures lost the entitlement to designate their senators, but 
Carpizo suggests that it makes no difference regarding the Court. 53 
In contrast, it is true that there is some kind of asymmetry here, but the 
question is whether it is justified. This Essay reasons that since the Senate 
is part of Congress, the fact that it approves a treaty is a legitimate means 
of annulling something that the two chambers approved before. 
Further, since Mexico is a federal system, there is no need for both 
chambers to have exactly the same overlapping powers. Hence requiring 
the President and the Senate to approve something on behalf of the federal 
state and federal entities seems proper, rather than asking the people to do 
it directly by way of referendum or indirectly through the people's 
representatives. This argument does not intend to decrease democracy, but 
suggests that it is mistaken to increase it at expenses of federalism when 
it is necessary to reconstitute both federalism and democratic government, 
which is consistent with their wording in the Constitution. 
Moreover, this Essay agrees that the status of the Senate as 
representative of the federal entities has been compromised. Since the 
adoption of proportional representation schemes, used to elect senators, 
there has been an alteration of the equal representation between large and 
small states. Central to this problem is that the interest of the federal 
entities are not being represented by the Senate even after the reforms are 
put in place. 
Second treaties have no limitations. Therefore the President and the 
Senate can commit the Mexican state in any subject, independently of 
being federal or reserved to the federal entities. Clearly, this is the main 
point from which the court derives part of its conclusion that treaties are 
above both federal and local laws. Yet the court probably should not have 
concluded that the federal and local laws were in the same hierarchy as 
that of treaties. 
However, we must clarify that, on the one hand, treaties do have limits 
imposed by Article 15, in which that article prohibits the formation treaties 
for extraditing political prisoners and for those criminals that had the 
condition of slaves, nor for treaties altering the guarantees and rights 
Tratados, in ENSA YOS EN TORNO A UNA PROPUESTA DE REroRMA CONSTITUCIONAL EN MATERIA 
DE POI.fTICA EXTERIOR Y DERECHOS HUMANOS 115 (Loretta Ortiz Ahlf et al. eds., 2004 ). 
52. Ramirez et al., supra note 40, at 197, 207-08. 
53. Jd. at 181. 
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established by this Mexican Constitution to the men and the citizen. 54 On 
the other hand, treaties lack limitations of competence that federal and 
local laws do contain. 
Third treaties are above both federal and local laws, and inferior to the 
Constitution itself. Thus, because treaties do not have the same limitations 
in competence as that offederal and local laws it seems that they can cover 
a much broader realm of subjects, including both federal and the federal 
entities. Treaties must meet three requirements (the frrst two are formal 
and the third is substantial). The first requirement is that the treaty be 
celebrated by the President. 55 The second element is that the treaty be 
approved by the Senate. The third element is that treaty be in accordance 
with the Mexican Constitution. 
The Mexican Supreme Court held at least three levels in the hierarchy 
of norms should be adopted. The court ruled that the Mexican Constitution 
should be the Supreme governing authority, treaties will come next and 
finally the federal and local laws. The problem with this hierarchical 
arrangement is twofold. First, this order leaves no space for the necessary 
intermediate levels. Second, this hierarchy places both federal and local 
laws in the same hierarchy, when they belong to different competencies as 
Article 124 of the Mexican Constitution establishes. 56 
On one side, it is not clear where the so-called constitutional laws, at 
least those that regulate an article or an institution of the Mexican 
Constitution, such as the Ley de Amparo - and even those that were 
enacted by the constitutional assembly of 1916-17- are located. It might 
be said that the constitutional laws and the treaties are in the same 
hierarchy, because they constitute norms that give unity to the federal state 
54. MEX. CONST. art. 15 
55. In February 24, 1998, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that the President does not have 
to negotiate a treaty personally in order for it to be valid, as long as he or she personally ratifies it. 
TRATADO DE EXTRADICI6N INTERNACIONAL CELEBRADO ENTRE 
MEXICOYESTADOSUNIDOSDENORTEAMERICA[sic]ELCUARTODE 
MAYO DE MIL NOVECIENTOS SETENTA Y OCHO. NO ES 
INCONSTITUCIONAL POR LA CIRCUNSTANCIA DE QUE EL 
PRESIDENTE DE LA REPUBLICA NO LO HAY SUSCRITO 
PERSONALMENTE, SI INSTRUYO AL SECRETARIO DE RELACIONES 
EXTERIORES PARA SU NEGOCIACI6N Y LUEGO LO RATIFICO 
PERSONALMENTE. 
Semanario Judicial de la Federaci6n, P. XLV/98, Mexico, 9 de Mayo de 1998, T. Vll, No. 
196,235, 133. Ricardo Mendez Silva, La Firma de los Tratados, 3 CUESTIONES 
CONSTITUCIONAIES. REVISTA MEXICANA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL, 209 (2000). 
56. ld.; MEX. CONST. art. 124. 
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as a whole, without providing an over-amount of attention either federal 
or local competencies. 57 But this reopens the question of what is supreme, 
in case of conflict, a constitutional law or a treaty? In fact the Mexican 
Court in this case seems to be overruling the principle that states 
constitutional laws were above treaties, yet that does not necessarily mean 
that a constitutional law is or must be always below a treaty. The 
resolution to this problem depends on the nature of the treaty, and 
constitutional1aw, that is at issue. 
On the other side, following an erroneous interpretation of Article 124 
that defines the competence of federal and local authorities, the Mexican 
Supreme Court rules that those federal and local authorities are in the same 
hierarchy.58 However, Article 124 states, ''The prerogatives that are not 
expressly conferred by the Constitution to federal authorities, and reserved 
to the states."59 As those authorities are different in terms of competence 
or realms of application, one federal and another local, they cannot be in 
the same hierarchy and still be in conflict. In fact, the Mexican 
Constitution in Article 41 clarifies that the sovereignty is exercised by the 
federal and local authorities in the terms of their respective competence, 
which is defined by the Federal Constitution and the local Constitutions. 60 
The only limitation is that the latter cannot contravene the former. 61 
Finally, by adopting those three levels in the hierarchy of norms the 
Mexican Supreme Court fails not only to leave space for intermediate 
levels but also fails to distinguish adequately among different kinds of 
federal laws and treaties. 
On the one side, federal laws can be distinguished by those identified 
as ordinary (federal) laws and those already labeled as constitutional laws 
(or federal constitutional laws). On the other side, all treaties are not the 
same and must not be put in the same box. 62 Consequently, in the 
following paragraph this Essay will clarify whether commerce or human 
rights treaties ought to prevail in an eventual case of conflict. 
C. What Ought to Prevail a Treaty on Commerce or on Human Rights? 
The distinction suggests some treaties are hierarchically inferior or 
superior to others. For example, this difference implies that treaties on 
human rights are more important than those on commerce. A constitutional 
57. Ramirez et al., supra note 40, at 182. 
58. MEX. CONST. art. 124. 
59. !d. 
60. !d. art. 41. 
61. !d. 
62. Cf Ramirez eta}., supra note 40, at 207. 
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reform to Article 133 does not necessarily mean to consecrate the special 
hierarchy of treaties on human rights over those on commerce. 63 Their 
hierarchical superiority is already embedded in the principles recognized 
recently by the jurisprudential and legislative criterions existing 
extensively in comparative law and in the Mexican legal doctrine.64 
Moreover it is helpful to recall some of these distinctions. The first 
difference is the number of signing parties, treaties are bilateral and 
multilateral. The second various is the process of their application, in 
which treaties are self-executing and nonself-executing. The third 
dissimilarity is the subject matter, in which the treaties cover a whole 
range of distinct issues, including commerce and human rights.65 
Regarding the last criteria, although it may be difficult to make an 
exhaustive hierarchy of treaties that are not impossible per se. 
In fact, on September 2, 2004, a controversial complementary bill on 
treaties in economic subject matters (Ley Sobre laAprobaci6n de Tratados 
Intemacionales en Materia Econ6mica) was published and was enacted 
the next day. This bill, among other things, lacks clarity as to why 
Congress had to approve another bill on treaties besides the one approved 
in 1992. However, the passage of that controversial bill reinforces not only 
that treaties on commerce and human rights can be put in different boxes, 
but also that the former are inferior to the latter. This law defines a "treaty" 
by referring to the definition included in the treaty approved in 1992 
(Article 1), and suggests that treaties, such as those in commerce (Article 
1 ), must be in accordance with the Mexican Constitution for respecting 
human rights and the separation of powers.66 
In sum, those treaties that amplify human rights coincides with the 
constitutional guarantees and must be placed on a second plane below the 
Mexican Constitution,67 whereas other types of treaties do not need such 
an arrangement. The fact that those agreements commerce must respect 
human rights subordinates those other types of treaties. In addition, treaties 
on commerce can be approved as mere agreements, like in the United 
63. Cf Mauricio Ivan del Toro Huerta, La Jerarqufa Constitucional de los Tratados 
lnternacionales en Materia de Derechos Humanos: Propuesta de Reforma al Articulo 133 
Constitucional, 1 PROPUESTA DE REFoRMAS LEGAlES E INTERPRETACI6N DE LAS NORMAS 
EXISTENTES 645 (2002). 
64. Hector Fix-Zamudio, El Derecho lnternacional de los Derechos Humanos en las 
Constituciones Latinoamericanas yen Ia Corte lnteramericana de Derechos Humanos, in JUST! CIA 
CONSTITUCIONAL, OMBUDSMAN Y DERECHOS HUMAN OS 452 (2d ed. 2001 ). 
65. Cf Huerta, supra note 63, at 659-60. 
66. Manuel Becerra Ramirez, Ley Sobre la Aprobacion de Tratados en Materia Economica, 
5 ANuARIO MEXICANO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 697 (2005). 
67. Cf Ramirez et al., supra note 40, at 175, 189, 207. 
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States, by the President and simple majorities in both chambers of 
Congress, as discussed above. Additionally, international or multilateral 
treaties are and must be above those regional and bilateral agreements, as 
well as those self-executing treaties need to be above nonself-executing 
treaties. 
Therefore, regarding the hierarchy of the Mexican legal system, the 
Mexican Supreme Court must adopt a multiple-standard that distinguishes 
the procedures for approval, their extent and subject matters. In short, we 
advocate for the adoption of criteria with at least five levels.68 The first 
level must pertain to the Mexican Constitution, which must be approved 
by a constitutional assembly elected ad hoc for that approval purpose, and 
reformed by two thirds of both chambers by a simple majority of 
legislative assemblies of all the federal entities. The second level needs to 
concern treaties on human rights and other self-executing treaties, 
approved by the President with a simple majority of the Senate with 
further requirements such as the two thirds mandate (as in the United 
States) or even via referendum. The third level should impact 
constitutional (or federal) laws, approved by a simple majority in both 
chambers, but regulated by one article or institution within the Mexican 
Constitution to guarantee its enforceability. The fourth level needs to 
include treaties on commerce and other nonself-executing treaties, 
approved by the President with a simple majority of the Senate or with a 
simple majority of two houses. The fifth level should pertain to ordinary 
federal laws, approved by simple majorities on both chambers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the process of reconstituting the Mexican Constitution, treaties have 
been essential. Now with the adoption of the above criteria it is possible 
to differentiate between treaties on commerce and on human rights. Also 
the Senate can be reformed into a representative of the federal entities, 
regardless of size, despite the Senate's past history. 
Furthermore, in order to enjoy our human rights, we should not deify 
commerce, but we must call to mind that Kant, in his basic formulation of 
the "categorical imperative," argues that one should "Act only in 
accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
68. Cf Loretta Ortiz Ahlf, Jerarqufa Entre Leyes Federales y Tratados, in ENSAYOS EN 
TORNO AUNA PROPUESTA DE REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL EN MATERIA DE POLtrl:CA EXTERIOR Y 
DERECHOS HUMANOS, supra note 51, at 135. 
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that it should become a universallaw."69 Moreover, from this premise, 
Kant derives a second formulation, which continues by stating "So act that 
you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, always at the same time as end, never merely as a means."70 
Similarly, from the idea that humans should not merely be subject to 
another's will, but to their own, Kant instructs us that "Every rational 
being must act as if he were by his maxims at all times a law-giving 
member of the universal kingdom of ends.'m 
In sum, one of the main challenges in the process of reconstituting 
constitutions is to use human beings not merely as a means to an end, but 
as ends in themselves, with human dignity, duties, and rights- including 
the right to be one's own lawgiver. Paradoxically, in order to convert from 
subjects of an authoritarian regime to citizens of a democratic republic, 
both national and international entities must, protect and enforce the rights 
of all human beings. 
69. IMMANuELKANT,GROUNDWORKOFTHEMETAPHYSICSOFMORALS 31 (N.Y. Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1998). 
70. /d. at 38. 
71. /d. at 45. 
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